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Communication technologies areno longer seen as just imping-ing upon societal concerns suchas privacy. Instead, computerscientists, social scientists, andpolicymakers are designing and
advocating the use of technologies
to proactively protect or serve soci-
etal values. These include protect-
ing minors from indecent content,
protecting privacy, and protecting
intellectual property rights [1]-[3].
The design of communication
technologies is not autonomous;
rather it is shaped by conflicting
social groups [4]. As a result, com-
munication technologies may have
different properties depending upon
their designers [5]. Consider the
stark differences in privacy features
between a university web browser
funded by government grants [6],
and a web browser developed by a
firm dependent upon marketing rev-
enue [7]. We focus here on how the
consideration of societal concerns is
affected by the institutional origins
of the technology. 
We focus on four important insti-
tutions for the development of com-
munication technologies. We use
the term “code” to refer to the hard-
ware and software of communica-
tions technologies. The four institu-
tions include universities, firms,
consortia, and the open source
movement. To study these institu-
tions we chose four historical case
studies. They are: NCSA Mosaic
web browser developed at the Uni-
versity of Illinois; cookies devel-
oped by Netscape; the Platform for
Internet Content Selection (PICS)
developed by the World Wide Web
Consortium (W3C); and the Apache
web server developed by the open
source movement. Based on these
case studies, we have found institu-
tional values translated into the
properties of the code.
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effort to systematically analyze the
production of code in societal insti-
tutions. This larger project begins
by considering the different roles,
motivations, end users, and struc-
tures of institutions. As a result, the
institutions are differentially
affected by social, political, eco-
nomic, and legal influences. This is
then reflected in the attributes of
the final code. These attributes
include technical features, such as
the use of open standards, as well
as features that affect societal con-
cerns, such as privacy. This article
focuses on the features that affect
societal concerns.
The consideration of societal
values in code is important for pol-
icymakers seeking code-based
solutions to societal concerns. Pol-
icymakers can use this analysis to
selectively support the develop-
ment of code in an institution. 
UNIVERSITIES
A university provides its devel-
opers considerable autonomy [8].
As a result, the academic develop-
ers largely determine the values in
the code. This allows social, eco-
nomic, or political influences to
affect code, reflecting the values of
the individual developers. Hence,
there is a wide variation in consid-
ering societal concerns, even in
similar projects by different devel-
opers. This difference in similar
projects is evident in the develop-
ment of web browsers by Berners-
Lee and Andreessen. Berners-Lee
developed the first web browser,
while Andreessen developed the
first mainstream web browser,
NCSA Mosaic.
Berners-Lee developed a web
browser that made it very easy for
people to read and write pages. He
envisioned the web as a place
where it would be easy for people
to find new information and con-
tribute new information. He consid-
ered it important to develop tools to
make it simple to publish material.
Instead of browsers, he thought of
the programs as browser/editors.
This value of publishing was incor-
porated in Berners-Lee’s code [9],
[10]. In contrast, Andreessen
focused on making a “cool” web
browser. To this end, he added mul-
timedia features, such as the inclu-
sion of online images. He was not
concerned with developing a web
browser that allowed people to cre-
ate content. Instead, his code val-
ued the presentation of content [9].
In sum, these variations in develop-
ment are allowed and encouraged
within universities.
FIRMS
The goal of commercial firms is
to develop profitable code. To this
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end, they include attributes that are
profitable. For example, firms prof-
it from code that allows visually
impaired people to use computers.
In this case, firms are producing
code that supports societal values.
However, firms may not produce
code that supports unprofitable but
socially beneficial values. This is
because firms seek to meet the
needs of consumers and not society
in general, which may then result in
a phenomenon known as market
failure [11]-[13]. This is not sur-
prising and is a consequence of the
structure and motivation of a firm.
There are four types of market
failure from the perspective of eco-
nomic efficiency. First, market fail-
ure occurs as a result of externali-
ties. This transpires when the
market price of a product does not
reflect the costs that its use and
production impose upon society.
The classic example is how indus-
trial pollution is usually not
accounted for in the calculation of
manufacturing costs of a product.
Similarly, security is an externality,
which is a cost not accounted for in
the production of code. The costs
of security have reached trillions of
dollars, and a single virus incident
that affects Microsoft’s Windows
based computers can cost over a
billion dollars [14], [15]. Commen-
tators have argued that Microsoft
ignores security as a deliberate
business decision [16], [17]. It
believes that ease of use is more
important than security [18]-[20].
However, the lack of security in
Microsoft’s products affects every-
one by propagating viruses, reduc-
ing bandwidth across the Internet
due to spurious traffic, and creating
insecure machines that are then
used to attack other machines
across the Internet. Since
Microsoft doesn’t pay for this cost,
this naturally leads to Microsoft’s
code overlooking the social value
of security, thereby imposing this
negative externality on others. 
Second, market failure arises in
the production of public goods.
Public goods are non-excludable
and non-rivalrous in consumption.
The classic examples of public
goods are property rights, national
defense, and infrastructure, such as
highways. Similarly, there are
code-based goods that have some
characteristics of a public good,
such as interface standards, open
source code, and code that address-
es issues such as education and
energy conservation. These are
examples of goods that will be
underprovided or not provided for
by firms.
Third, market failure occurs
when markets are monopolistic or
oligopolistic, instead of being com-
petitive. With information tech-
nologies, there are two phenomena
that can lead to uncompetitive mar-
kets. First, network effects may
lead some markets towards monop-
oly [21]. For example, communi-
cation networks become more
valuable as they become larger,
which can result in a monopolistic
market. Secondly, lock-in and
switching costs can lead to uncom-
petitive markets [21]. An example
of lock-in is AOL’s Instant Messen-
ger. Lock-in occurs because only
AOL subscribers can use this ser-
vice. There are substantial switch-
ing costs for customers, since you
cannot access AOL’s Instant Mes-
senger once you terminate your
AOL service.
Fourth, market failure can occur
because of incomplete information
or an asymmetrical allocation of
information. The classic example
is the used car market, where the
seller of used cars possesses much
better information about the cars,
and as a result, the lemons will
crowd out the good used cars. The
history of cookies illustrates how
consumers have less information
than firms. Cookies are a technolo-
gy that allows web sites to main-
tain information on their visitors.
This technology facilitates repeat-
ed interactions that are often
required for electronic commerce.
Netscape incorporated the cookies
technology into its browsers. How-
ever, Netscape never incorporated
tools that would allow users to
manage cookies in their browsers
[22]. Moreover, Netscape didn’t
notify users about the cookies tech-
nology. As a result, information
was maintained on consumers by
web sites without their knowledge.
Netscape probably understood that
if consumers knew about this fea-
ture, this could have led to a priva-
cy backlash against cookies and
lowered the adoption of the
Netscape browser. This is an exam-
ple of a firm exploiting the infor-
mational asymmetry between firms
and consumers.
The second justification for
market failures is not based on
economic efficiency, but on ethi-
cal considerations. There are
three types of market failures that
can arise even when markets are
efficient. First, market failure
occurs when redistribution of
goods does not result in social
standards of equity. This is why
there are programs such as uni-
versal service, which ensure that
all citizens have access to
telecommunications. A second
market failure occurs when peo-
ple do not act in their own self-
interest. This calls for paternal-
ism. An example of paternalism
affecting code was the restriction
on the transmission of indecent
content to minors. A third market
failure occurs when the market
does not allow everyone equal
opportunity. This leads to govern-
ment intervention to ensure that
everyone has an equal opportuni-
ty regardless of race, gender, eth-
nicity, or disability. For example,
government intervention has
required code capable of being
accessed by disabled citizens. 
CONSORTIA
A consortium’s response to soci-
etal concerns is influenced by its
structure. This section focuses on
how the goals, membership, and the
development process within a con-
sortia influence the incorporation of
societal concerns. First, we note that
consortia differ in their willingness
to develop standards that address
societal values. Second, we note the
role of the development process in
the inclusion of societal values.
Finally, we note how the decision-
making process can affect the soci-
etal values in code.
The PICS case study showed
how a consortium setting allowed
industry to cooperate in addressing
a societal concern. PICS addressed
the problem of minors accessing
indecent content by specifying
standards for labeling the content.
This was a fitting purpose since
firms individually would not sup-
port such an unprofitable societal
value. This led James Miller, a co-
developer of PICS to state,
“[I]ndustry has never demonstrat-
ed, and it continues with the priva-
cy stuff to demonstrate that unless
a very serious external threat is
imposed it will not get together and
unify with any speed to address any
serious vital issue.”
The disadvantage of the consor-
tium approach is that it may
address a societal concern in a way
that benefits the consortium’s
members over the general public.
For example, PICS was designed
by the W3C to address societal
concerns about children’s access to
inappropriate material. However,
PICS failed to make a significant
difference in children’s access to
inappropriate material because the
solution produced by the W3C was
more about avoiding regulation
than addressing the problem. This
is evidenced by both the timetable
for the development of PICS which
sought to ensure it was completed
in time for a constitutional chal-
lenge to the Communications
Decency Act (CDA) as well as the
lack of support for PICS after the
CDA was found unconstitutional.
Similar criticisms have been laid at
the W3C’s efforts in addressing
privacy concerns with the Platform
for Privacy Preferences (P3P) pro-
ject [23], [24]. Jason Catlett of
Junkbusters believes that the real
motive behind the W3C’s efforts is
not user privacy, but to stave off
potential legislation on privacy. So
while a consortium may address
societal concerns, it is biased by its
reliance on its members’ efforts
and motivations. As a result, a con-
sortium’s product may be of mar-
ginal value to society.
The development process can
affect the inclusion of societal val-
ues in code for a consortium.
Specifically, social concerns may
be manifested to different degrees
during the development process
depending upon the consortium’s
membership. For example, by
including a diverse
pool of contributors,
the Internet Engi-
neering Task Force
(IETF) is more sen-
sitive to societal con-
cerns during the
d e v e l o p m e n t
process. The IETF’s
standard on cookies
was more responsive
to privacy due to the
diversity of its par-
ticipants. Koen Holt-
man, who participat-
ed in the discussion,
had a distinctively
different attitude
towards privacy than
most Americans
because he was
European. His different perspective
led him to point out the privacy
problems with cookies that others
had disregarded. 
The decision-making process at
a consortium can also affect the
inclusion of societal values. A con-
sortium can be structured to allow
for public review during the deci-
sion-making process. For example,
the IETF’s open membership and
emphasis on rough consensus
affected the development of the
cookies standard. Rough consensus
allowed members of the IETF to
consider a wider array of values
going beyond merely profitable
ones. David Kristol, a co-author of
the IETF’s cookies standards, stat-
ed that he was under tremendous
pressure to ignore the privacy and
security problems of third party
cookies [25]. But under the IETF’s
decision-making structure, he had
enough freedom to resist these
pressures. As a result, the IETF’s
standard for cookies addresses pri-
vacy and security concerns.
OPEN SOURCE MOVEMENT
The open source movement
consists of thousands of diverse
developers. Some of these develop-
ers are employed by firms, while
others are committed to creating
free software for the benefit of
society. As a result, the open source
movement is subject to a variety of
influences. This is often manifested
in the wide-ranging values of open
source code that sometimes
includes the marginal values of
society. Our first point is that the
open source movement is less sub-
ject to the dominant economic and
political influences. Second, we
note that the open source move-
ment is biased by the societal con-
cerns of its members. Our third
point notes how the open source
movement can be influenced by
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use of technologies to proactively
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bottom-up social influences. Final-
ly, we discuss how the open source
movement’s support of modularity
can allow for the development of
code that supports a mosaic of
social values.
Developers within the open
source movement have a consider-
able amount of autonomy. The
international group of volunteer
developers decides the code’s val-
ues. As a result, the open source
movement is less subject to the
dominant economic and political
influences. The inclusion of politi-
cally, economically, or socially
unpalatable features can be seen in
open source code, such as the open
source web browser Mozilla and
file sharing programs. Mozilla
includes the ability to block images
from third party web sites as well
as pop up advertising windows.
File sharing programs, such as
Gnutella, have facilitated wide-
spread piracy.
The open source movement is
biased by the societal concerns of
its members, which are not repre-
sentative of the public. Despite the
diversity of open source develop-
ers, they often share similar beliefs
about some issues. For example,
the open source movement has not
addressed the issue of children’s
access to inappropriate material on
the Internet. This is not surprising
given the anti-censorship inclina-
tion of the open source movement.
These similar beliefs can shape the
development of open source code
because of the dependence on vol-
unteer developers. This shows how
the development of code within the
open source movement is shaped
by its members’ proclivities.
The open source development
process also allows for bottom-up
social influences. By allowing the
public to comment and participate
in the design, there is room for bot-
tom-up pressure. For example,
Apache has had over 400 individu-
als contribute code, along with
over 3000 people have contributed
problem reports [27]. This bottom-
up pressure is not necessarily from
programmers, but could involve
others who participate and support
open source projects in other ways.
One manifestation of bottom-up
pressure is through the use of wish
lists where the public can request
new features. This is under-exploit-
ed, but it is useful to ensure that
developers are cognizant of the
needs of users.
The open source movement’s
use of modularity is capable of
simultaneously supporting diverse
social values. Through modularity,
users can choose the modules that
best support their values. For
example, consider the modular
open source browser Mozilla.
Modularity of the browser code
means that it will be possible to
customize the browser. For exam-
ple, a browser could be construct-
ed to only visit children’s sites as
rated by PICS. Or a browser could
be modified to not accept third-
party cookies, or the browser’s
bookmarks could also be cus-
tomized so as to contain a set of
religious sites. The modularization
of the open source code makes it
possible to select values from a
mosaic of code [26].
PRIVACY AS AN
ILLUSTRATION OF
INSTITUTIONAL
DIFFERENCES
Institutions can differently
affect a societal value. The value
under consideration here is infor-
mational privacy. 
Universities provide their
developers with considerable
autonomy. This allows them to
focus on developing code without
having to incorporate features that
may compromise privacy. There
are researchers actively working to
incorporate privacy technologies
into code, for example, by design-
ing a web browser that is sensitive
to issues of privacy [6]. Moreover,
other researchers argue that uni-
versities should lead by example
by developing and using technolo-
gies in ways that are sensitive to
privacy [28]. 
Firms are likely to support pri-
vacy to the extent that it is prof-
itable. As a result, there are a num-
ber of firms selling code that people
can use to protect their privacy.
However, as a general matter, firms
are not emphasizing privacy fea-
tures in their code. As noted above,
this is due to market failures. Lessig
argues that this market failure can
be addressed by treating personal
information as property [29]. Pro-
viding a legal entitlement over per-
sonal information could lead to the
development of code that allows
people to control this property. Oth-
er commentators argue that addi-
tional forms of market failures,
which arise from information
asymmetries and other factors,
means that a property-based
approach is insufficient to induce
the development of code that con-
siders privacy [30]. Consequently, a
firm “is eager to spy on us to create
its marketing lists and profiles
while, at the same time, seeking to
keep this process opaque and refus-
ing to grant basic fair information
practices.” These market failures
have led to the under production of
code that embodies the basic value
of privacy.
Consortia may be structured to
deal with societal issues such as
privacy. For example, the W3C is
working on a privacy project titled
P3P, because it met the needs of its
members. In contrast, the W3C
chose not to work on cookies.
According to Roger Clarke, he
raised this matter with Berners-
Lee. According to Clarke, the
“W3C avoided the matter entirely,
reflecting the increasing con-
straints on its freedom of action
arising from its desire to avoid
upsetting its corporate spon-
sors”[31]. Besides differences in
deciding what projects to pursue, a
consortium’s membership and
decision-making process can affect
its consideration of societal con-
cerns. For example, the IETF’s
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public review process was con-
cerned about the privacy risks with
cookies [32].
The open source movement is
not as influenced by economic
incentives to violate privacy. So we
would expect the development of
code to protect privacy. However,
there is not a wide array or even a
single good open source program to
protect people’s privacy. This is
because there is no coordinated
effort in the open source movement
to develop tools to protect privacy.
Moreover, there is little work on
developing such code. For example,
a search on the popular open source
web site, SourceForge, finds only
one working project that addresses
problems with privacy and cookies.
This program was originally created
by a firm and then released to the
open source movement. So while
the open source movement has
improved the code, it did not initiate
its development.
There are two explanations for
the lack of development of privacy
tools for the general public. First,
the open source community is
technically sophisticated, and
therefore, does not suffer from an
informational asymmetry regard-
ing privacy. That is, they under-
stand the privacy risks with code as
well as how to use code to limit pri-
vacy losses. A second more cynical
explanation concerns the motiva-
tions of developers that seek peer
recognition and prestige for career
advancement [33]. These develop-
ers abstain from working on priva-
cy features, because privacy fea-
tures are not desired by the firms
they are seeking to impress.
HOW SOCIETY CAN
REGULATE CODE
Most scholarly work on code
has highlighted how code regu-
lates society. This article has
stressed how society can regulate
code through societal institutions.
Our analysis has shown how insti-
tutions differ in their incorporation
of societal concerns into code. The
results of our analysis should
allow policymakers to shape the
development of code by the choice
of institution.
Policymakers can now begin by
analyzing whether a firm is likely
to incorporate a specific societal
concern into code. If not, policy-
makers may seek the aid of other
institutions such as universities, the
open source movement, or consor-
tia, if appropriate. To this end, we
have highlighted how each of these
institutions has its own approach
and tendencies when incorporating
societal concerns. For example, the
open source movement is biased by
the motivations, beliefs, and soci-
etal concerns of its members. It is
our ultimate hope that this analysis
will allow policymakers to antici-
pate and guide the development of
code that contributes positively to
society.
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